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NOTES
ORGAN ALLOCATION AND THE STATES: CAN
THE STATES RESTRICT BROADER ORGAN
SHARING?
RODERICK T. CHEN*
INTRODUCTION
More than twenty thousand patients in the United States received organ transplants in 1997, yet over fifty thousand patients
were still waiting for a transplant at the end of that year.1 Indeed,
over four thousand patients died waiting for a transplant in 1997.2
The scarcity of organs highlights the need for a fair and efficient organ allocation system. Despite this need, not every patient in the
United States has the same chance to receive a transplant. For example, in 1995, patients in Iowa had a median wait of twenty-eight days
for a liver transplant. Patients in Pennsylvania, however, had to wait
a median of 237 days for the same transplant.3 State-to-state disparity
exists because of policies developed by the United Network of Organ
Sharing (“UNOS”), the private organization in charge of the national
organ transplantation effort. These policies generally mandate a
preference for local transplant recipients in the allocation of human
organs. For example, a liver procured in Iowa must first be offered to
patients within the area of original procurement, then to patients in
the surrounding region, and finally to patients in the rest of the country.

* I would like to thank Clark Havighurst for reading earlier drafts, as well as Duncan
Douglass and Michael Anstett of the Duke Law Journal for their editorial assistance.
1. See United Network for Organ Sharing, Waiting List (visited October 29, 1999)
<http://www.unos.org/newsroom/critdata_wait.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
2. See id.
3. See Bruce Alpert & John Pope, Waiting Lists for Livers Debated, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 26, 1997, at A1.
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On April 2, 1998, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) issued a Final Rule declaring that geographic distinctions are no longer an appropriate basis for allocating organs.4 In order to promote broad organ sharing in the United States, the Final
Rule directs UNOS to develop an equitable allocation policy using
medical urgency as the primary selection criterion.5 The Final Rule
includes a provision preempting any state law contrary to its directives.6
Critical of the motivations underlying the Final Rule, and concerned about its potential impact,7 many transplant physicians appealed to Congress to delay or prevent its implementation.8 Indeed,
their lobbying efforts first succeeded in delaying the implementation
of the Final Rule for one year.9 In the meantime, HHS issued a clari4. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296, 16,297
(1998) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1998)).
5. See id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)(3)(i)).
6. See id. at 16,338 (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.12).
7. See, e.g., Putting Patients First: Resolving Allocation of Transplant Organs: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Env’t of the House Comm. on Commerce and
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 232, 233 (1998) [hereinafter
Hearing on the Final Rule] (statement of Howard M. Nathan, Executive Director of the Delaware Valley Transplant Program) (arguing that the Final Rule would have an “adverse impact
on patients and their families”); Caroline Daniel, Transplant System Proposal Stirs Anxiety;
Some Fear National Effort to Standardize Wait for Organs Will Hurt Regional Programs,
WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1998, at A6 (noting that the Final Rule could unfairly take organs away
from small transplant centers); Dr. Michael DeBakey, Only More Problems With Transplant
Policy Change, HOUS. CHRON., June 18, 1998, at 39 (arguing that the Final Rule might “reduce
the number of people who get transplants and thus cause more patients to die”); Karen Klinka,
Transplant Centers Wary of System, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 27, 1998, at 1 (noting one
transplant physician’s view that the government’s real motive behind promulgating the Final
Rule is to help maintain profits at large transplant centers).
8. See, e.g., Hearing on the Final Rule, supra note 7, at 233 (statement of Howard M. Nathan) (challenging national allocation of organs as inefficient and impractical); Hearing on the
Final Rule, supra note 7, at 224 (statement of Dr. William E. Harmon, representing the New
England Organ Bank and the American Society of Transplant Physicians) (“[W]e do not believe that national sharing is practical or necessary, except in unusual circumstances. . . . Regional sharing is medically sound and reasonable and will go a long way toward equalizing
waiting times.”); Hearing on the Final Rule, supra note 7, at 212 (statement of Dr. Hector C.
Ramos) (“[W]e do not need to redistribute organs at great cost and loss of organ suitability. We
need to increase organ donation.”).
9. See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 213(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-359 (1998). Additionally, Congress charged
the Institute of Medicine, a division of the National Academy of Sciences, to study the possibility of wider organ sharing in the United States. See id. § 213(b), 112 Stat. at 2681-359, 2681-360.
On July 20, 1999, the Institute of Medicine released the results of its study, finding that organs
could be more widely shared than the current UNOS policy allows. See IOM Panel Recommends Wider Sharing of Organs, Greater Data Access in Final Report, 8 Health L. Rep. (BNA)
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fication of the Final Rule, continuing to insist that organs be allocated based on medical urgency and not geography.10 After more delays and much negotiation between HHS and Congress, the Final
Rule is now scheduled to take effect by March 2000.11
Many states realized that the implementation of the Final Rule
could cause some organs procured through state organ donation efforts to be transferred to transplant recipients outside the state.
Seven states—Louisiana, South Carolina, Wisconsin, Oklahoma,
Texas, Arizona, and Florida—enacted laws placing restrictions on
out-of-state organ transfers, thereby attempting to maintain the
status quo allocation system.12 The majority of these state laws prohibit the transfer of organs recovered within the state to potential
out-of-state recipients unless no suitable in-state transplant recipient
is found or the states’ transplant organizations have a reciprocal organ-sharing agreement.13 Because the states had never controlled the
allocation of organs before the Final Rule was issued, these laws represent a remarkable development in organ transplant law.
This Note examines the new state laws that restrict the transfer
of organs outside the state. Because these laws attempt to recast organ allocation as a states’ rights issue, they invite scrutiny on two
separate but closely related fronts. First, do the federal statutes and
regulations on organ transplantation preempt these state laws? Second, do the state laws place an undue burden on interstate commerce
and therefore violate the Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution?
In Part I of this Note, I provide a brief synopsis of the federal
and state laws and regulations governing organ transplantation in the
United States. I examine in Part II the law of preemption and con1192 (July 22, 1999). The report calls for organs to be allocated within regions based on how
long the transplant organ can survive outside the body. See id.
10. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,650, 56,651-60
(1999) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.8) (explaining that the Final Rule does not require a
single national list for the allocation of organs).
11. See Laura Meckler, Transplant Rules on Hold, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 19, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 28141454.
12. See States Enact Laws to Keep Organs Home as OPO Regions Voluntarily Begin
Sharing, 8 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 535 (April 1, 1999).
13. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-846 (West 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2353
(West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2204 (West 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-420 (Law.
Co-op. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 157.06(9) (West 1998); Act of June 18, 1999, ch. 615, sec. 4, §
692.0145, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (Vernon). Florida’s law, in contrast, simply requires that an
organ procured in the state be offered to a recipient on a Florida-based organ-sharing list. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.922(6) (West 1999).
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sider whether existing federal organ transplant law preempts the new
state laws regulating organ allocation. In particular, I will analyze the
Final Rule’s preemption statement and demonstrate that it is an invalid exercise of the authority of HHS. I will also show that the state
laws are not preempted by any federal statute, including the National
Organ Transplant Act of 1984. In Part III, I consider the possibility
that the state laws are unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine. I will argue that these laws are unconstitutional restraints on interstate commerce and should be struck down by the
courts. However, applying doctrines like federal preemption and the
dormant Commerce Clause may fail to achieve a sound consideration
of organ allocation policy. In Part IV, therefore, I raise policy questions not considered by these constitutional doctrines and conclude
that Congress should provide clearer instructions for allocating these
scarce resources.
I.

THE LAWS AND POLICIES GOVERNING ORGAN ALLOCATION

After HHS issued the Final Rule calling for broader organ
sharing in the United States, several states passed laws restricting
out-of-state organ transfers. Prior to the passage of these laws, however, the allocation of organs in this country had been governed by a
complex array of federal statutes, regulations, and quasi-legal policies.
A. Federal Laws
In 1984, Congress recognized the need for a national effort to
coordinate organ transplantation and passed the National Organ
Transplant Act (“NOTA”).14 NOTA authorized HHS to make grants
for the establishment and operation of organ procurement organizations (“OPOs”).15 OPOs are private, nonprofit entities responsible for
procuring organs in a defined service area and allocating those organs
to suitable recipients.16 Each OPO is required to have agreements
with hospitals and other health care facilities in its service area to acquire and preserve organs.17 In addition, NOTA originally required
OPOs to implement “a system to allocate donated organs among
14. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 99 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 273(a) (1994).
16. See id. § 273(b).
17. See id. § 273(b)(3).
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transplant centers and patients according to established medical criteria.”18 Currently, there are sixty-three OPOs operating in the
United States.19
NOTA also requires HHS to establish a system for overseeing
the national exchange of organ transplants, to be called the Organ
Procurement and Transplantation Network (“OPTN”).20 To that end,
HHS must contract with a private nonprofit organization that has expertise in organ transplantation to maintain the OPTN.21 The responsibilities of the OPTN include compiling a national list of individuals
who need organs and creating a national system to match organs and
individuals on the national list based on established medical criteria.22
The OPTN must also “assist [OPOs] in the nationwide distribution of
organs equitably among transplant patients.”23 Since 1986, UNOS has
held the government contract to maintain the OPTN.24
While NOTA originally allowed for the allocation of organs on a
local basis, Congress has amended the statute twice since its initial
passage to reflect its growing concern with the distribution of organs
on a nationwide basis.25 In 1988, Congress directed the OPOs to allocate donated organs “equitably among transplant patients” rather

18. National Organ Transplant Act, § 201, 99 Stat. at 2048.
19. See Hospitals Told to Report Deaths to Organ Facilities, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1998, at
A1; Editorial, New Transplant Rules: Life or Death Choices, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 5, 1998, at 6;
Richard Saltus, U.S. Seeks a Change in Organ Allocation, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 27, 1998, at
A3.
20. See 42 U.S.C. § 274(a).
21. See id.
22. See id. § 274(b)(2).
23. Id. § 274(b)(2)(D).
24. See Fred H. Cate, Human Organ Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 J. CORP. L. 69,
78 (1995).
25. In addition, Congress strengthened the power of the OPTN by adding section 1138 of
the Social Security Act to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986. Section 1138 required that transplant hospitals and OPOs comply with the rules and regulations of the OPTN
as a condition of receiving Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. See Pub. L. No. 99-509, §
9318(a), 100 Stat. 1874, 2009 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320b-8(a)(1)(B),
(b)(1)(D) (1994)). Because hospitals and OPOs depend heavily on these reimbursements, section 1138 appeared to make the OPTN’s rules binding on these institutions. See James F. Blumstein, Federal Organ Transplantation Policy: A Time for Reassessment?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
451, 467-68 (1989); Benjamin Mintz, Analyzing the OPTN Under the State Action Doctrine—
Can UNOS’s Organ Allocation Criteria Survive Strict Scrutiny?, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
339, 348 (1995). Nevertheless, HHS has subsequently issued a federal regulation declaring that
OPTN rules will not bind institutions unless the Secretary formally approves an OPTN recommendation of enforcement. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed.
Reg. 16,296, 16,336 (1998) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.10(c)).
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than “among transplant centers and patients.”26 This change reflected
Congress’s desire to allocate organs based on patient need rather
than the needs of transplant centers and hospitals. Congress further
amended NOTA in 1990, directing the OPTN to “assist organ procurement organizations in the nationwide distribution of organs equitably among transplant patients.”27
One additional provision of NOTA bears mention. NOTA explicitly prohibits the sale or purchase of human organs for transplantation purposes.28 Thus, donors and their families cannot profit from
their donations. This, however, does not prevent reasonable payments associated with removal, transplantation, implantation, and
storage of a human organ.29
B. The Policies of UNOS
Since 1986, UNOS has held the government contract to manage
and create rules of governance for the OPTN.30 UNOS is a membership organization comprising every transplant center and organ procurement organization in the United States.31 Four goals drive
UNOS’s organ allocation policy: (1) to enhance the availability of
transplantable organs; (2) to allocate organs based on medical criteria, with equal consideration of medical utility and equity; (3) to provide potential transplant recipients with reasonable opportunities for
transplants; and (4) to respect the autonomy of persons.32 In particular, “medical criteria” includes a consideration of biological compatibility of the donor and the recipient, medical urgency, optimal efficiency in physically moving the organ from the donor to recipient,
and medical utility and justice.33 Based on these goals, UNOS has de-

26. Health Omnibus Programs Extension of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-607, § 402(c)(1)(C), 102
Stat. 3048, 3115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 273(b)(2)(E)).
27. Transplant Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-616, § 202(b), 104 Stat. 3279,
3284 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C § 274(b)(2)(D)).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (1994).
29. See id. § 274e(c)(2).
30. See Cate, supra note 24, at 78.
31. See Jeffrey Prottas, Human Tissues As Medical Treatment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 445, 457
(1991).
32. See United Network for Organ Sharing, UNOS Principles and Objectives of Equitable
Organ Allocation (visited Aug. 16, 1999) <http://www.unos.org/about/principles.htm> [hereinafter UNOS Principles and Objectives of Equitable Organ Allocation] (on file with the Duke
Law Journal).
33. See id.
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veloped and followed a series of rules governing the allocation of
vascular organs, including hearts, livers, and kidneys.
For the allocation of hearts, UNOS provides that such “organs
are to be allocated locally first, then within . . . [three zones] delineated by concentric circles of five-hundred- and one-thousandnautical-mile radii with the donor hospital at the center.”34 UNOS defines local allocation as within the service area of the original donor
hospital.35 Zone A, the first allocation zone, begins outside the donor
hospital service area and extends to all transplant centers within 500
miles from the donor hospital.36 Zone B extends to all transplant centers at least 500 miles but not more than 1,000 miles from the donor
hospital, while Zone C incorporates all transplant centers beyond
1,000 miles from the donor hospital.37 Within these zones, each potential recipient is ranked by a point system that considers the patient’s
medical urgency, time spent on the waiting list, and blood match.38
UNOS’s allocation policy for livers has also followed a local
preference. Until recently, the policy required that available livers
first be offered to local patients, usually within the OPO’s service
area.39 If no suitable local recipient was found, the liver was then
made available to recipients within the OPO’s surrounding region.40
34. United Network for Organ Sharing Policy 3.7.2 (last modified June 25, 1999)
<http://www.unos.org/About/policy_policies.htm> [hereinafter UNOS Policy] (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
35. See id. Policy 3.1.7.
36. See id. Policy 3.7.2.
37. See id.
38. See id. Policies 3.6.2-3.6.4.
39. See id. Policy 3.6.
40. See id. UNOS has defined 11 regions in the United States:
Region 1 – Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Vermont
Region 2 – Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Northern Virginia, West Virginia
Region 3 – Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Puerto
Rico
Region 4 – Oklahoma, Texas
Region 5 – Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah
Region 6 – Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, Washington
Region 7 – Illinois, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin
Region 8 – Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Wyoming
Region 9 – New York
Region 10 – Indiana, Michigan, Ohio
Region 11 – Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia

CHEN TO PRINTER

268

11/30/99 3:05 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:261

If no suitable recipient was found within the region, the liver was
then offered to patients nationally.41 As with heart transplants, potential liver recipients in each distribution level are ranked according to
medical urgency, time spent on the waiting list, and blood match.42
Largely in response to criticism of this strict local-preference policy,
UNOS revised its liver allocation policy in June 1999 to provide
greater consideration of the medical urgency of potential recipients.43
However, the new policy continues to provide for liver allocation on
a geographic basis.44
UNOS’s allocation policy for cadaveric kidneys is primarily
based on finding the best biological match between the donated organ and a potential recipient, but still gives a preference to local
transplant recipients. When a transplantable kidney is harvested, doctors must determine if there are any potential recipients with perfect
antigen compatibility.45 The more compatible the antigen match, the
less likely that the recipient’s immune system will reject the donated
kidney.46 If a perfect match is found, the kidney is first offered to that
recipient, no matter where the recipient is located.47 If there are multiple potential recipients who match perfectly, however, the kidney
usually goes to the potential recipient who is closest geographically to
the site of organ procurement.48 Absent a perfect match, the kidney is
allocated first to local patients within the OPO’s service area.49 If no
suitable recipient is found locally, the kidney usually is offered next

Id. Policy 3.5.5.4.
41. See id. Policy 3.6.
42. See id. Policies 3.7.3-3.7.9.
43. United Network for Organ Sharing, News Release (June 25, 1999)
<www.unos.org/newsroom/archive_newsrelease_19990625_liver.htm> (on file with the Duke
Law Journal); Organ Transplants: UNOS Board of Directors Approves Policy Change Allowing
Wider Sharing of Livers, 8 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1067 (July 1, 1999).
44. See UNOS Policy 3.6, supra note 34.
45. See id. Policy 3.5.2.3. The matching process involves analyzing and comparing six histocompatibility antigens, also called HLA antigens, in the cells of both the donated kidney and
the recipient. See Terry Schraeder, New Tack Pays Off on Organ Rejection, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 17, 1998, at C1.
46. See Schraeder, supra note 45.
47. See UNOS Policy 3.5.2.3, supra note 34.
48. See id. Policy 3.5.2.3.1. An exception to this rule is when an OPO is owed a kidney as
payback for having sent a kidney to another OPO because of perfect antigen compatibility. See
id. Policy 3.5.2.3.1; Prottas, supra note 31, at 460.
49. See UNOS Policy 3.5.5, supra note 34; id. Policy 3.1. In fact, perfect matches rarely
occur, making geography the de facto main factor for kidney allocation. See Prottas, supra note
31, at 459-60.
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to the regional area defined by UNOS,50 and then nationally.51 Within
each level of distribution, potential recipients are ranked on a point
system that weighs the time spent on the waiting list and the quality
of antigen match.52 Oddly, the recipient’s medical urgency is not a
factor in the regional or national allocation of kidneys.53
Thus, UNOS allocates vascular organs based on the geographical
proximity of potential transplant recipients. Additionally, UNOS allows OPOs to enter into organ-sharing arrangements with other
OPOs.54 Because these reciprocal arrangements often occur among
the OPOs within a state, they usually serve to reinforce the local
preference in organ allocation.55
Several reasons are given to justify a local preference in organ
allocation. First, an organ remains viable for successful transplantation for only a limited time once procured from a human body.56 The
local preference in allocation minimizes the time an organ spends
outside a human body, thereby reducing organ wastage.57 Second,
transplant professionals contend that the local preference helps keep
small community transplant centers open and therefore ensures
wider access to organ transplants.58 Without the local-preference
50. See UNOS Policy 3.5.5.2, supra note 34. Again, the exception is when an OPO is owed
a payback kidney after sharing a kidney with another OPO because of perfect antigen compatibility. See id. Policy 3.5.2.3.1.
51. See id. Policy 3.5.5.3.
52. See id. Policy 3.5.9.
53. See id. Policy 3.5.9.4.
54. See id. Policy 3.7.1.
55. See Erik S. Jaffe et al., Eliminating Artificial Barriers to the Equitable Distribution of
Hearts for Transplantation, 20 J. CORP. L. 109, 114-15 (1994) (noting that the primary local distribution unit in a state may actually be multi-OPOs acting within a sharing agreement).
56. Once the heart stops in a human body, the organs begin to deteriorate from the absence of blood circulation and eventually become unsuitable for transplantation. See Marla K.
Clark, Solving the Kidney Shortage Crisis Through the Use of Non-Heart-Beating Cadaveric
Donors: Legal Endorsement of Perfusion as a Standard Procedure, 70 IND. L.J. 929, 933 (1995).
57. See Hearing on the Final Rule, supra note 7, at 142 (statement of Lawrence G. Hunsicker, President, UNOS) (“The transplant community has found that as the length of time organs go without a blood supply increases, the likelihood of a successful transplant significantly
decreases.”); Jaffe, supra note 55, at 131 (noting that “UNOS itself has used the issue of ischemic time to discuss without analysis the question of expanding heart distribution”).
58. See Putting Patients First: Resolving Allocation of Transplant Organs: Joint Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health and Env’t of the House Comm. on Commerce and Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. available in 1998 WL 12761471 (statement of the Patient Access to Transplantation Coalition) [hereinafter Patient Access to Transplantation Coalition Statement] (“[The Final Rule would] distribute organs away from small
and mid-size transplant centers to a few large centers with a high percentage of hospitalized
patients. This may force some of the regional centers, which serve larger numbers of minority

CHEN TO PRINTER

270

11/30/99 3:05 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:261

policy, the argument goes, all transplants would be performed by a
few specialized hospitals in the country, such that small transplant
centers would fail for lack of business.59 If this is indeed the case, the
Final Rule would be particularly harmful to minority and poor patients, because these groups tend to utilize local transplant centers.60
Some also contend that a local preference in allocation encourages
organ donation efforts.61 This argument is based on the premise that
organ donors are largely motivated by the desire to help patients in
their local communities.62
C. The State Anatomical Gift Acts
Though federal laws and UNOS policies govern the allocation of
organs in the United States, the individual states have traditionally
regulated the act of organ donation. In 1968, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act (“UAGA”).63 The UAGA provides that any individual who is at least eighteen years old may donate his vascular
organs.64 If a decedent has not indicated a preference for or against
organ donation, the decedent’s family is authorized to donate the decedent’s organs.65 Hospitals, procurement organizations, accredited
medical schools, and physicians may receive anatomical gifts.66 These
recipients are required to use the gifts solely for transplantation,
and low-income patients, to close.”); Organ Allocation Forum Yields Variety of Opinions,
UNOS UPDATE, Mar. 1994, at 3, quoted in Jaffe, supra note 55, at 133 n.97 (“‘[A]ny attempt to
nationalize the waiting list of recipients would jeopardize the viability of many smaller, yet
equally successful programs. These programs are important, keeping recipients close to home,
family and the community support system.’”) (quoting liver-recipient Charles J. Hutson).
59. See supra note 58.
60. See Hearing on the Final Rule, supra note 7, at 142 (statement of Lawrence G. Hunsicker, President, UNOS) (noting that the closure of local transplant programs might adversely
affect minority patients more than nonminority patients).
61. See Patient Access to Transplantation Coalition Statement, supra note 58 (arguing that
the “nationalization” of organ allocation would “reduce the incentives for vigorous, community-based efforts to increase organ donations”); see also Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296, 16,304 (1998) (noting the argument that local allocation
promotes organ donation and retrieval by local transplant surgeons).
62. See Alpert & Pope, supra note 3 (quoting Dr. John McDonald as saying that “people
who do donate do so knowing that they will go to their friends, colleagues and others in need in
their communities”). This premise, however, has been disputed. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
63. See UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (amended in 1987), 8A U.L.A. 63 (1993).
64. See id. § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. at 33.
65. See id. § 3(a), 8A U.L.A. at 40.
66. See id. § 6(a), 8A U.L.A. at 53.
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therapy, medical education, or research purposes.67 Alternatively, an
organ donor may designate a specific recipient of the anatomical gift
for transplantation purposes.68 The UAGA forbids the sale or purchase of human organs for transplantation purposes.69 By 1972, every
state had adopted an anatomical gift act resembling the UAGA.70
D. The Final Rule
On April 2, 1998, HHS issued a Final Rule setting three performance goals for UNOS, as the organization that maintains the
OPTN.71 First, UNOS must define objective medical criteria to be
used by all transplant centers in determining whether a patient
should be placed on a waiting list for a transplant.72 Second, UNOS
should develop status categories based on objective medical criteria
so that every transplant center would use a common measurement in
determining the urgency of a patient’s condition.73 Finally, UNOS
must “develop equitable allocation policies that provide organs to
those with the greatest medical urgency, in accordance with sound
medical judgment.”74
The last performance goal essentially calls for UNOS to abandon
the local-preference allocation policy. The Final Rule explicitly
states: “OPO areas should not be the primary vehicle for organ allocation.”75 Moreover, “[n]either place of residence nor place of listing
shall be a major determinant of access to a transplant.”76 In addition,
if the Secretary of HHS is dissatisfied with UNOS’s allocation poli67. See id.
68. See id. § 6(b), 8A U.L.A. at 53.
69. See id. § 10, 8A U.L.A. at 58. Oddly enough, UAGA does not prohibit the sale or purchase of organs for purposes other than transplantation, i.e., research or education. See Alexandra Glazier, “The Brain Dead Patient Was Kept Alive” and Other Disturbing Misconceptions; A Call for Amendments to the Anatomical Gift Act 14 (Sept. 21, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
70. See Cate, supra note 24, at 71. Most states have amended their anatomical gift acts to
require that hospitals routinely inquire whether each patient is an organ donor and discuss with
each patient the option of becoming one. See Uniform Anatomical Gift Act §5(a), 8A U.L.A.
47 (1993).
71. See Organ Procurement and Transportation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296, 16,296
(1998) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.8 (1998)); Saltus, supra note 19.
72. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. at 16,296 (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)).
73. See id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.8(a)(3)(i)).
74. Id. (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.4).
75. Id. at 16,312.
76. Id. at 16,335.
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cies, she may instruct UNOS to adopt a new policy or develop a policy that UNOS must follow.77
HHS justified this increased federal oversight on grounds of equity and fairness. In particular, HHS found that local preference in
allocation created vast geographic disparities in waiting times for potential organ transplant recipients.78 For example, in 1994–1995, a patient waiting for a kidney transplant at the Oregon Health Sciences
University Hospital in Portland, Oregon, had a median waiting time
of 147 days, while a patient at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, had a median waiting time of
822 days.79 In 1995, the median wait for a liver transplant in Louisiana
was sixty-seven days, while the median wait for a liver transplant in
Illinois was 349 days.80 For heart transplants, the median waiting
times in 1992 ranged from fifty-five days in Region 4 (Oklahoma and
Texas) to 767 days in Region 11 (Kentucky, North Carolina, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia).81
HHS also noted that there are no longer strong reasons for a local preference in allocation. Medical advances now allow many vascular organs to be preserved for much longer periods of time.82 Livers, for example, may be kept viable for transplantation for up to
eighteen hours without detriment to successful transplantation.83
Kidneys can last from twelve to twenty-four hours outside the human
body.84 Thus, it is possible to have an allocation policy that does not
rely on keeping organs within local OPO service areas or regions.
Moreover, recent studies demonstrate that organ donors are not motivated to donate simply because it helps the local community,85 cast77. See id. at 16,300.
78. See id. at 16,298.
79. See id. at 16,311.
80. See Alpert & Pope, supra note 3.
81. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 59 Fed. Reg. 46,482, 46,486-87
(1994); UNOS Policy 3.5.5.4, supra note 34.
82. The development of the Belzer UW solution in the 1980s was crucial to the dramatic
increase in organ survival time outside the human body. See Organ Procurement and Transportation Network, 63 Fed Reg. at 16,298.
83. See id. at 16,304.
84. See Laurie McGinley, New U.S. Rules on Organ Donors Heighten Debate, WALL ST. J.
EUR., Mar. 27, 1998, at UK5A. Hearts and lungs, by contrast, last only from four to six hours
outside the human body. See id.
85. See Organ Procurement and Transportation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. at 16,304; OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, HHS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANTATION:
EXPECTATIONS AND PRACTICES 14 (1991). Even UNOS has admitted to the lack of evidence
linking donation rates with the degree of localization in organ allocation. See United Network
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ing doubt on the contention that organ donation would decline if local preferences were eliminated. Finally, transplant organs have been
characterized as “a national resource to be used for the public
good . . . .”86
Anticipating that some states would try to block an organ allocation policy based on wider sharing within the United States, HHS included a preemption clause in the Final Rule:
No State or local governing entity shall establish or continue in effect any law, rule, regulation, or other requirement that would restrict in any way the ability of any transplant hospital, OPO, or other
party to comply with organ allocation policies of the OPTN or other
policies of the OPTN that have been approved by the Secretary un87
der this part.

If operative, this preemption statement would nullify any inconsistent
state or local law that affects organ allocation policy.
E. The New State Organ Allocation Laws
As HHS anticipated, many states expressed serious concern with
the Final Rule’s directive for broader organ sharing. Since the promulgation of the Final Rule in April 1997, seven states—Louisiana,
South Carolina, Wisconsin, Texas, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Florida—have enacted laws that attempt to block any changes the Final
Rule might make in the allocation of organs.88 Florida’s law mandates
that any organ procured in the state must first be offered to potential

for Organ Sharing, The UNOS Statement of Principles and Objectives of Equitable Organ Allocation 24 (1993).
86. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, HHS, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION:
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 86 (1986); see also AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS AND CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS § 2.16(6) (1994) reprinted in CODES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 286
(Rena A. Gorlin ed., 3d ed. 1994) (“Organs should be considered a national, rather than a local
or regional, resource.”).
87. Organ Procurement and Transportation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. at 16,338 (codified at
42 C.F.R. § 121.12).
88. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-846 (West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.922(6)
(West 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2353 (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2204
(West 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-420 (Law. Co-op. 1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 157.06(9)(d)
(West 1998); Act of June 18, 1999, ch. 615, sec. 4, § 692.0145, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
(Vernon). Kentucky is considering a similar law. See Organ Transplants: States Enact Laws to
Keep Organs Home as OPO Regions Voluntarily Begin Sharing, 8 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 535
(April 1, 1999).
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recipients on a Florida-based organ-sharing list.89 The remaining state
laws provide that a vascular organ recovered by the state’s OPOs
shall not be transferred outside the state unless one of the following
two conditions exists: (1) no suitable recipient within the state can be
found in a reasonable amount of time; or (2) the state’s OPOs have a
reciprocal agreement with an out-of-state procurement organization.90 Such laws, if valid, would inhibit the implementation of a national organ allocation policy based on medical urgency rather than
geography. In effect, these laws are intended to maintain the localpreference allocation policy developed by UNOS before the Final
Rule.
Yet, the new state laws represent more than just attempts to
maintain the status quo. Before the states enacted these laws, the distribution of organs in the United States had been determined by an
uneasy relationship between the federal government and transplant
professionals. These laws, however, recast organ allocation as a
states’ rights issue.91 In effect, the states argue that they may regulate
the distribution of organs pursuant to the police power to protect the
health and welfare of their citizens. Thus, these laws not only raise
questions about the proper allocation of human organs, but also
prompt serious federalism concerns. Specifically, how does the preemption clause of the Final Rule affect the state organ allocation
laws? Do the existing federal laws on organ transplantation allow for
state involvement in the distribution of organs? Are federal constitutional concerns implicated when states regulate the distribution of
organs? Which public- or private-sector body should determine how
transplantable organs are distributed? The following parts consider
these questions.

89. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.922(6).
90. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-846; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2353(6); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 2204.B.2; S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-420; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 157.06(9)(d);
Act of June 18, 1999, ch. 615, sec. 4, § 692.0145, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
91. Governor Tommy Thompson of Wisconsin has stated, “In this state, we go out and
aggressively encourage people to be donors, with me doing public-service announcements. If
I’m going to do that, I want those organs to stay in the state and take care of the patients that
need it in Wisconsin.” Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Fight Over Organs Shifts to States from Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1999, at A1.
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II. PREEMPTION LAW AND THE STATE ORGAN ALLOCATION LAWS
A. The Law of Preemption
The apparent conflict between state laws that regulate organ allocation and a federal regulation purporting to preempt these state
laws compels an examination of the law of preemption. Preemption is
the power of the federal government to supplant state law.92 The preemption power is traditionally justified by the Supremacy Clause,
which states that “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”93
In Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,94 the Supreme Court announced that principles of federalism require a presumption against
preemption; that is, courts should analyze preemption cases under
the assumption “that the historic police powers of the States were not
to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and
manifest purpose of Congress.”95 Therefore, when called upon to consider a preemption case, the Court has focused its analysis on congressional intent to preempt.96 Congress’s intent is most clear when a
federal statute contains explicit language addressing its preemptive
effect on state laws.97 For example, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) explicitly preempts “any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any em92. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n
v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-54 (1982); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 22930 (1947). Of course, the federal government may only do so when it acts pursuant to one of its
constitutionally delegated powers. See Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal
Law: A Task for Congress or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1995).
93. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. However, some scholars have argued that the power of preemption can be derived from the Necessary and Proper Clause. See Harrop A. Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 630, 638 (1972) (arguing
that preemption may be derived from the Necessary and Proper Clause); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 781-82 (1994) (arguing that preemption must be derived from the Necessary and Proper Clause).
94. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
95. Id. at 230.
96. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (stating that state law ought not to be preempted “‘unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress’”) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone’ of preemption analysis.”) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435
U.S. 497, 504 (1978)).
97. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
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ployee benefit plan . . . .”98 Such a clause leaves little room for judicial
discretion in determining whether federal law preempts state law.99
However, the Supreme Court has shown tremendous flexibility
in finding congressional intent to preempt even in the absence of explicit statutory language.100 There are several circumstances where
“implied preemption” of state law occurs. Conflict preemption will
nullify state law when “compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,” 101 or when state law “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.”102 State law may also be preempted because a federal law occupies the same field of law.103 So-called field
preemption occurs when “[t]he scheme of federal regulation [is] so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the States to supplement it,”104 or when the federal law
“touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the
federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws
on the same subject.”105
The focus on congressional intent when considering preemption
is justified on grounds of judicial restraint, democracy, and federalism. Federal courts should exercise restraint when examining laws
passed by Congress, as long as Congress has acted within its constitutional powers.106 Because members of Congress are elected and federal judges are not, Congress possesses a stronger mandate to make
preemption determinations. Finally, as the only branch of the federal
government in which the states have representation (through sena98. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
99. See Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140 (1990) (ruling that ERISA preempted a state common law wrongful-discharge claim because the plaintiff allegedly was discharged in order to prevent the attainment of benefits under an ERISA plan); Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331-34 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033
(1992) (holding that ERISA preempts malpractice claims against utilization review of benefitallocation decisions); see also Stabile, supra note 92, at 19-56 (arguing that Congress should
abstain from incorporating express preemption clauses in statutes and instead leave preemption determinations to the courts).
100. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 505; Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc.,
471 U.S. 707, 721 (1985).
101. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
102. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941).
103. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963) (noting that “it is up to legislatures,
not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation”).
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tors and representatives), Congress has the unique ability and responsibility to balance federal and state interests.107
Federal regulations issued by administrative agencies can preempt state law to the same extent as federal statutes.108 Following the
traditional focus on congressional intent, courts should consider
“whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state
law.”109 When Congress has explicitly authorized the agency to preempt, state law can be preempted by federal administrative regulations.110
However, the Supreme Court has found administrative preemption even when explicit congressional authorization to preempt does
not exist. In United States v. Shimer,111 the Court did not even consider congressional intent when it held that Veterans Administration
regulations preempted state law. Instead, the Court applied the following two-pronged test: (1) whether the agency itself intended to
preempt state law; and (2) whether the regulations were a proper exercise of the agency’s discretionary authority.112 The Court’s analysis
suggested that when Congress grants agencies broad discretionary
authority over certain matters, it inherently includes the power to
preempt state law.
In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta,113 the
Court reaffirmed the two-pronged test used in Shimer. The Court
stated: “Where Congress has directed an administrator to exercise his
discretion, his judgments are subject to judicial review only to determine whether he has exceeded his statutory authority or acted arbitrarily. When the administrator promulgates regulations intended to
preempt state law, the court’s inquiry is similarly limited.”114 Therefore, an agency may issue regulations that preempt state law where
Congress has delegated discretionary authority in the matter to the
agency.

107. See Susan Bartlett Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory
Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1432-33 (1984).
108. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
109. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 369 (1986).
110. See id.
111. 367 U.S. 374 (1961).
112. See id. at 379-83.
113. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
114. Id. at 153-54 (citation omitted).
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This standard for administrative preemption strayed from the
Supreme Court’s traditional focus on congressional intent.115 The reason for this deviation may lie in the Court’s desire to leave a certain
amount of discretion to administrative agencies and even to grant
deference to agency interpretations of the law. This deference was
formalized in 1984 in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De116
fense Council. The Court held in Chevron that the judiciary should
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of federal statutes. In particular, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”117 Yet, this
amount of deference to administrative agencies is hard to reconcile
with the Court’s traditional view of preemption, which involved a
presumption against preemption unless congressional intent to preempt was clear.118 Though Chevron indicated the Court’s willingness
to defer to agency interpretations of federal statutes, the Court left
unanswered the question of how much deference it would grant
agencies that attempt to preempt state law.
In Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC,119 decided two
years after Chevron, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the two-pronged
preemption test first used in Shimer.120 Rejecting the FCC’s claim that
its depreciation rules preempted any state rules on the matter, the
Court declared:
[A] federal agency may pre-empt state law only when and if it is
acting within the scope of its congressionally delegated authority.
This is true for at least two reasons. First, an agency literally has no
115. See Howard P. Walthall, Jr., Comment, Chevron v. Federalism: A Reassessment of
Deference to Administrative Preemption, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 715, 739-40 (1998) (“[T]he Court
has consistently refused to grant deference to an agency’s expansive preemption claims, and
has conducted an independent analysis into congressional intent.”).
116. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
117. Id. at 843. The Chevron Court explained that Congress sometimes leaves gaps in statutes, implicitly delegating the power to fill these gaps to administrative agencies. The Court
noted other justifications for judicial deference to reasonable agency interpretations. Agency
officials, unlike judges, have expertise in the fields they regulate. Moreover, agencies, unlike
courts, are accountable to the President and Congress. See id. at 842-44, 865.
118. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Paul E.
McGreal, Some Rice With Your Chevron?: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 823, 824 (1995) (discussing the Court’s increased accommodation of agency action); Walthall, supra note 115, at 740 (stating that the Court has traditionally
not deferred to agency preemption claims but rather has inquired into congressional intent).
119. 476 U.S. 355 (1986).
120. See id. at 374.
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power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation of a
sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it.
Second, the best way of determining whether Congress intended the
regulations of an administrative agency to displace state law is to examine the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to
121
the agency. . . . An agency may not confer power upon itself.

The Court applied the Shimer test again in City of New York v.
122
FCC, this time holding that FCC regulations preempted state law
because the regulations fell within the FCC’s discretionary power under the Cable Act.123 These two post-Chevron cases confirm that in
order for an administrative agency to preempt state law, Congress
must have granted broad discretionary rulemaking authority to the
agency.
The Supreme Court’s reluctance to defer completely to agency
determinations involving preemption is understandable. Federal
agency administrators are not democratically elected. Though agency
administrators are accountable to the President, such accountability
may not be a strong-enough check against the potential for overly
expansive federal government authority.124 Federal agencies, unlike
Congress, have no direct ties to the states and are therefore poorly
positioned to balance federal and state interests.125 Thus, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that regulations purporting to preempt
state law are valid only if Congress has granted the administrative
agency broad discretionary power over the matter.
B. Does the Final Rule Preempt the State Organ Allocation Laws?
Given the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on administrative preemption, a court considering the Final Rule should find the preemption clause of the Final Rule invalid for several reasons. First, Congress has never explicitly granted HHS the power to preempt state
law. The statutory language of NOTA does not include a grant of this

121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. 486 U.S. 57 (1988).
123. See id. at 69-70.
124. See David A. Herrman, To Delegate or Not to Delegate—That is Preemption: The Lack
of Political Accountability in Administrative Preemption Defies Federalism Constraints on Government Power, 28 PAC. L.J. 1157, 1169-70 (1997) (discussing the importance of accountability
and elected decisionmakers in the federal system).
125. See Walthall, supra note 115, at 756.
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power to HHS.126 Moreover, the legislative history of the Act makes
no reference to preemption.127
Furthermore, the Final Rule’s preemption clause does not meet
the two-pronged test for administrative preemption developed in
Shimer. Under the Shimer test, judicial review of the Final Rule’s
preemption clause would focus both on whether HHS intended to
preempt state law and on whether the Final Rule fell within the scope
of discretionary authority conferred upon HHS. Because HHS explicitly inserted a preemption statement in the Final Rule, the first
prong of the Shimer test would easily be satisfied.
However, neither the statutory language nor the legislative history of NOTA indicates that Congress granted HHS broad discretionary authority over organ allocation policy. When Congress passed
NOTA in 1984, it wanted to develop a “national policy regarding the
appropriate federal and private sector roles in organ transplantation.”128 To that end, NOTA authorized HHS to give grants to OPOs
and to establish, by contract, the OPTN.129 Yet, a Senate Report from
the Committee on Labor and Human Resources made clear that “the
national coordinating effort, while stimulated by the federal government and [NOTA], should nonetheless be located in the private sec130
tor, rather than in government.” This statement reflects Congress’s
desire to limit the role of government bureaucracy in organ transplantation.
Though subsequent amendments to NOTA indicate Congress’s
preference for a nationwide equitable distribution of organs,131 Congress placed the power to create such policies with the OPOs and the
OPTN (managed by UNOS), not with HHS. In the 1988 Amendments to NOTA, Congress stated that “the OPO is responsible for
allocating organs equitably among the patients who are in need of a
transplant,”132 and that the OPTN should “facilitate an equitable allocation of organs among patients. . . . [and] resolve any issues regarding the fair and effective distribution of organs.”133 Congress declared
that it did not wish “the statute to be read as establishing a prefer126. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-74 (1994).
127. See S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 13-17 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3979.
128. Id. at 13.
129. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
130. S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 15 (emphasis added).
131. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
132. S. REP. NO. 100-310, at 12 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4236, 4240.
133. Id. at 13-14.
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ence for, or against, distribution [of organs] within the service area of
the OPO.”134 In addition, because the OPTN was charged with making quasi-legal policy decisions, the OPTN must to follow appropriate
rulemaking procedures such as holding public hearings.135 Congress
intended HHS to serve the relatively limited role of publishing notices of public hearings and receiving public comment.136
The 1990 amendments to NOTA confirmed that Congress did
not grant broad discretionary authority to HHS to make organ allocation policy. Congress noted that “[t]he OPTN, in addition to maintaining the single national list of all patients waiting for an organ
transplant, is also charged with setting much of national transplant
policy.”137 To this end, the OPTN may make “policy decisions on such
matters as assuring the organ sharing system is fair and equitable to
patients.”138 HHS, on the other hand, should promulgate performance
standards on OPO service areas to ensure maximum efficiency and
effectiveness in organ distribution.139 Indeed, the legislative history of
NOTA and its amendments indicates that HHS’s authority is rather
limited. Because HHS does not have broad discretionary authority
over organ allocation, it may not promulgate regulations that preempt state law. Thus, a court considering this issue should invalidate
the Final Rule’s preemption clause and hold that the state organ allocation laws are not affected by the Final Rule.
C. Does NOTA Preempt the State Organ Allocation Laws?
Despite the fact that the Final Rule’s preemption clause is
probably invalid, the state organ allocation laws might still be preempted by NOTA itself. While NOTA does not explicitly preempt
state law, a court could find that NOTA implies preemption under
either conflict preemption or field preemption analysis.140
At present, the case for conflict preemption is weak. Federal and
state laws do not appear to be in true conflict, since the state laws and
NOTA could coexist under the local preference in allocation policy
followed by UNOS. However, if UNOS changes its allocation policy

134. Id. at 14.
135. See id. at 13.
136. See id.
137. S. REP. NO. 101-530, at 19 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4625, 4639.
138. Id. at 20.
139. See id. at 13, 21-22.
140. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.

CHEN TO PRINTER

282

11/30/99 3:05 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 49:261

to provide for broader organ sharing among states, the quasi-legal
UNOS policies might conflict with the new state laws, necessitating
conflict preemption analysis. Although the courts have yet to consider this scenario, it would seem highly irregular for a court to rule
that a private organization’s policies preempt state legislative determinations.141
A better case can be made that NOTA preempts the entire field
of organ allocation. As stated earlier, field preemption may occur either when a federal regulatory scheme is pervasive enough to allow
the conclusion that Congress left no room for the states to supplement federal control, or when a federal law governs a field in which
there is a dominant federal interest.142 To be sure, Congress acknowledged the existence of the state anatomical gift acts and allowed
them to stand when it enacted NOTA in 1984.143 One may therefore
argue that Congress never intended NOTA to create a pervasive federal regulatory scheme that preempts the entire field of organ transplantation.144 Yet, an equally plausible interpretation would be that
Congress regarded the state laws as dealing exclusively with organ
donation and not the field of organ allocation. If transplant organs
are indeed “a national resource,”145 a court conceivably could find
that the federal interest is sufficiently dominant in the field of organ
allocation to preempt any state law that touched this field.
Such a field preemption argument is nevertheless a tenuous one.
The Supreme Court has generally been reluctant to find a dominant
federal interest that preempts an entire field of law.146 Certainly, the
141. A related question is one that has been considered by Benjamin Mintz: can UNOS
policy be considered state action? Mintz notes that state action might exist if the government
compels or encourages UNOS decisions. See Mintz, supra note 25, at 374. It would seem that
the Final Rule would fulfill this requirement.
142. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
143. See S. REP. NO. 98-382, at 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3975, 3977. The
Senate Report acknowledged that the “present system is a mixture of private sector initiatives
and governmental involvement on both the State and Federal levels.” Id.
144. In any case, the pervasiveness of federal regulation constitutes weak evidence of congressional intent to preempt, since modern regulation often requires comprehensive rules. See
New York Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 414-15 (1973) (rejecting the argument
that the comprehensive nature of the Work Incentive Program preempted a New York state
work program); McGreal, supra note 118, at 837 (discussing the weakness of
comprehensiveness as an indicator of congressional intent to preempt an entire field).
145. See supra note 86.
146. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)
(finding insufficient support for the claim that federal regulations establishing minimum standards for the collection of blood plasma preempt county ordinances governing blood plasma
centers); McGreal, supra note 118, at 835-37 (stating that the Court has been hesitant to find
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Court has had little problem finding state law preemption when foreign affairs or national security interests are involved.147 Yet, the
Court remains committed to the notion that the states are endowed
with the power to regulate the health and welfare of their citizens and
that this power should not be preempted absent clear congressional
purpose to do so.148 The courts are thus likely to find that NOTA does
not provide a sufficiently strong indication of a dominant federal interest in organ allocation to preempt the state laws.
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE STATE ORGAN
ALLOCATION LAWS
A. Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
Even if existing federal law does not preempt the state organ allocation laws, courts may still find them invalid under the dormant
Commerce Clause. The dormant Commerce Clause allows courts to
strike down state and local laws that are unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.149 This judicially inferred doctrine is derived from
Article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which grants Congress
the power to regulate commerce among the states. In Gibbons v.
150
Ogden, one of the first cases to consider the extent of the commerce
power, Chief Justice John Marshall recognized that granting Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce necessarily precluded the states from regulating interstate commerce.151 Since Gibbons, federal courts have invoked this dormant Commerce Clause
power to invalidate state and local laws.152
One of the fundamental rationales underlying the dormant
Commerce Clause is that states should not be allowed to enact legis-

field preemption solely on the basis of the comprehensiveness of a particular federal program).
147. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-69 (1941) (striking down a state law that
required aliens to register with the state Attorney General).
148. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
149. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-69 (1945); South Carolina State
Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-86 (1938); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 317-21 (1851).
150. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
151. See id. at 196-222.
152. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 344-48 (1992) (declaring unconstitutional a state law that required out-of-state companies, but not in-state companies, to pay hazardous waste–disposal fees); Southern Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 779-84 (striking
down a state law that limited the length of railroad trains operating in the state).
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lation that discriminates against residents of other states.153 Such protectionist legislation creates inefficiencies and harms the nation’s
economy.154 Indeed, the Framers created a federal commerce power
in part because of their concern over the proliferation of state laws
that taxed other states for the use of in-state ports.155 It would be unfair for a state to enact laws that harm nonresidents because nonresidents lack the political representation that would allow them to
change discriminatory laws.156
Though numerous tests have been used to determine when states
unconstitutionally regulate interstate commerce,157 the modern ap153. See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986). In fact, Professor Regan argues
that the dormant Commerce Clause should only be used to strike down purposeful state protectionism, no more and no less. See id. at 1098.
154. See id. at 1118 (“[P]rotectionism is inefficient because it diverts business away from
presumptively low-cost producers without any colorable justification in terms of a benefit that
deserves approval from the point of view of the nation as a whole.”).
155. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 309
(1997). James Madison envisioned the commerce power “as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the
positive purposes of the General Government . . . .” Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell
(Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
156. See South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2
(1938) (“[W]hen the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon those
without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints
which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the
state.”). Numerous legal scholars have criticized the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
Some note that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit states from enacting protectionist
legislation. See Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J.
425, 435-37 (1982) (arguing that while the dormant Commerce Clause may have served a purpose in the country’s infancy, the doctrine is no longer needed today); Martin H. Redish &
Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987
DUKE L.J. 569, 571 (commenting that the Constitution does not authorize the courts to invalidate state commerce legislation). Others argue that Congress, and not unelected federal judges,
should decide whether state law unduly burdens interstate commerce. See Patrick C. McGinley,
Trashing the Constitution: Judicial Activism, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and the Federalism Mantra, 71 OR. L. REV. 409, 453-56 (1992); Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125, 150. These arguments, while meritorious, are beyond the
scope of this Note. It is sufficient to say that the courts have continued to use the dormant
Commerce Clause in the face of these arguments.
157. See DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 41-42 (1927) (analyzing whether a state law
that required persons selling steamship tickets for foreign travel to obtain a license and bond
from the state directly interfered with interstate commerce or only had an indirect effect);
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 314 (1851) (illustrating the tension between national subject matters and local matters); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
203-12 (1824) (making the distinction between the improper regulation of commerce and the
proper exercise of the state’s police power).
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proach has been to employ a two-step review.158 A court must first inquire whether the state law is a measure that facially discriminates
against out-of-state economic interests.159 An example of such discrimination is when a state law overtly blocks the flow of goods at its
borders in order to boost the local economy.160 A court considering
such a blatant form of economic discrimination will presume the state
law to be unconstitutional and will invalidate it.161 On the other hand,
if the state law seeks to advance a “legitimate local public interest”
and does not discriminate against interstate commerce on its face, the
law will be upheld unless the burden it places on interstate commerce
is “clearly excessive” compared to its local benefits.162 In employing
this balancing test, a court will consider the “nature of the local interest involved,” and “whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.”163
A state or local law can facially discriminate against interstate
commerce in a number of ways. For example, a state could impose
requirements on out-of-state articles of commerce that do not apply
to in-state articles.164 Often, states attempt to prevent the export of
resources, thereby preventing out-of-state residents from using these
resources. Such laws frequently have been invalidated by the Supreme Court. In Hughes v. Oklahoma,165 the Court struck down an
Oklahoma law that forbade the transport of minnows outside Oklahoma if the minnows were procured from in-state waters.166 The
Court found that “such facial discrimination invokes the strictest
scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose,” and it struck
down the law because no such purpose was found.167 New England

158. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945).
159. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
160. See id. at 623-29; see also Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 276-77 (1875) (declaring
invalid a law that required sellers of out-of-state goods to obtain a license to sell in Missouri).
161. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624.
162. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 42-44 (1980) (invalidating a
Florida law that explicitly discriminated against bank holding companies whose principal operations were outside of Florida); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 524-26 (1935)
(striking down a New York law restricting the prices of milk products from out-of-state producers and preventing such products from being sold at a price lower than in-state milk).
165. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
166. See id. at 338.
167. Id. at 337.
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168
Power Co. v. New Hampshire presented a similar situation. There, a
New Hampshire law prohibited a utility company from conveying
electricity out of the state except with the permission of New Hampshire’s public utility commission.169 The Court struck down the law as
an unlawful facial restriction on interstate commerce.170 Finally, in
171
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court invalidated a New Jersey law
that prevented the city of Philadelphia from sending its wastes to
New Jersey landfills.172 The Court ruled that this law violated the
dormant Commerce Clause because it “erect[ed] a barrier against the
movement of interstate trade.”173
Significantly, states have often enacted laws that have reciprocity
requirements, which allow a nonresident to access the state’s resources only if the nonresident’s state grants similar benefits to the
state’s citizens. The Supreme Court, however, has consistently ruled
that such requirements are facially discriminatory and thus presumptively unconstitutional. For example, in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
174
Co. v. Cottrell, the Court invalidated a Mississippi law that allowed
milk to be shipped into Mississippi from another state only if the
other state would accept milk from Mississippi on a reciprocal basis.175
In doing so, the Court patently rejected Mississippi’s contention that
the reciprocity clause served vital interests in maintaining the health
and welfare of its citizens.176 Similarly, in Sporhase v. Nebraska,177 the
Court rejected Nebraska’s reciprocity requirement for the interstate
transfer of groundwater.178 The Court found that a reciprocity requirement acted as “an explicit barrier to commerce” between
states.179

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

455 U.S. 331 (1982).
See id. at 335.
See id. at 331.
437 U.S. 617 (1978).
See id. at 629.
Id. at 628.
424 U.S. 366 (1976).
See id. at 381.
See id. at 375.
458 U.S. 941 (1982).
See id. at 957-58.
Id. at 957.
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B. Are the State Organ Allocation Laws Unconstitutional Under the
Dormant Commerce Clause?
Courts considering the new state laws restricting out-of-state organ transfers should strike them down as violations of the dormant
Commerce Clause. Crucial to this argument is a determination that
the distribution of organs constitutes interstate commerce. The limited case law on this issue supports this conclusion. In 1988, the U.S.
District Court of New Jersey decided Delaware Valley Transplant
180
Program v. Coye, a case involving a New Jersey regulation that
designated a New Jersey organ bank as “the sole organ procurement
agency for New Jersey.”181 The district court could find no other purpose for the designation except to “preclude other organizations from
procuring organs within the State.”182 Accordingly, the court invalidated the regulation under the dormant Commerce Clause, calling it
a “highly protectionist effort to keep organs retrieved in New Jersey
from being used in out-of-state transplant operations.”183 The court
thus recognized that organ distribution affects and involves interstate
commerce.
To counter a dormant Commerce Clause challenge, the states
might argue that organ procurement and distribution do not involve
interstate commerce. After all, NOTA and the UAGA both expressly prohibit the purchase and sale of human organs for transplantation purposes.184 This argument, however, employs circular reasoning. Congress acted pursuant to its power to regulate interstate
commerce when it prohibited the purchase and sale of human organs.
Indeed, organ procurement and distribution must involve interstate
commerce if NOTA is valid at all.185 United States v. Wang186 supports
this conclusion. There, the district court found that the “‘transfer [of]
human organs . . . for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation . . . [could] affect interstate commerce.’”187 Ultimately, it
180. 678 F. Supp. 479 (D.N.J. 1988).
181. Id. at 481.
182. Id. at 482.
183. Id. at 481.
184. See supra notes 28-29, 69 and accompanying text.
185. The Supreme Court used a similar rationale in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941
(1982). The Court noted that if groundwater is not an article of commerce, it not only exempts
the state law from dormant Commerce Clause analysis, but also curtails Congress’s affirmative
power to implement its own regulations on the matter. See id. at 953.
186. No. 98 Cr. 199(DAB), 1998 WL 556160 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1998).
187. Id. at *2 (quoting the indictment).
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would be impossible to characterize organ transplantation as having
no relation to interstate commerce. Many OPOs arrange the procurement and allocation of organs for several states and therefore
necessarily engage in interstate activities.188 The fact that OPOs share
some organs with out-of-state OPOs, either through reciprocal
agreements or UNOS policies, indicates that organ procurement and
distribution involves interstate commerce.
Accepting that organ distribution involves interstate commerce,
a court must then consider whether the state organ allocation laws
discriminate against interstate commerce. The state laws provide that
all organs harvested within the state should not leave the state unless
there is no suitable recipient found within the state or there is a reciprocal agreement with an out-of-state procurement organization.189
It would appear that interstate commerce is clearly burdened since
the states have curtailed the transfer of organs across state lines. Indeed, similar state laws that burdened the flow of interstate commerce were struck down in Philadelphia v. New Jersey and Hughes v.
190
Oklahoma. Additionally, the reciprocity clauses in many of the
state organ allocation laws are similar to the reciprocity clause that
the Supreme Court deemed facially discriminatory to interstate
commerce in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.191
The states might contend that their laws promote a legitimate local purpose, namely, the preservation of a scarce resource. In
192
Sporhase v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a
state may act within its police power “to conserve and preserve for its
own citizens [a] vital resource in times of severe shortage.”193 The
Court reasoned that a “demonstrably arid State conceivably might be
able to marshal evidence to establish a close means-end relationship
between even a total ban on the exportation of water and a purpose
to conserve and preserve water.”194 Similarly, the states might be able
188. The New England Organ Bank, for example, serves Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island. See The New England Organ Bank (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://www.neob.org> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). Similarly,
LifeCenter Northwest serves Alaska, Washington, Montana, and Northern Idaho. See LifeCenter Northwest (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://www.lcnw.org/about_fs.html> (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
189. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
191. 424 U.S. 366, 372-73 (1976).
192. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
193. Id. at 956.
194. Id. at 958.
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to classify human organs as a scarce resource195 and demonstrate that
the restriction on interstate commerce is crucial to maintaining the
supply of human organs within the state. Yet, the Sporhase Court
eventually struck down the state law that purported to conserve
groundwater, noting that the state’s interest in conserving groundwater had an interstate dimension: “[T]here is a significant federal interest in conservation as well as in fair allocation of this diminishing
resource.”196 Human organs can easily be characterized in a similar
fashion. Human organs have never been considered a state resource;
to the contrary, both the Task Force on Organ Transplantation and
the American Medical Association have said that organs are national
resources.197 Thus, courts considering the new state laws should find
these laws unconstitutional under the Sporhase rationale.
IV. CONSIDERING ORGAN ALLOCATION POLICY
A. How Should Organs Be Allocated?
Underlying these deliberations on preemption law and the dormant Commerce Clause are issues of health care law and policy beyond a court’s jurisdiction. How should transplantable organs be distributed? Who ought to decide how they are distributed? Should
organ allocation policy be left to health care providers, or should the
distribution of organs be based on a consumer-driven market? What
is the proper role of the federal government in organ allocation?
While it is clearly appropriate for the courts to settle controversies
involving the constitutionality of certain laws, courts should be wary
of making these broader policy determinations.
Many factors can and should be considered in allocating scarce
resources like transplant organs. HHS implicitly argues that justice
and fairness should be the primary consideration by calling for organ
allocation based on the medical urgency of the patients.198 Yet, justice
and fairness would also seem to demand that the patient who has

195. Although about 20,000 transplants were performed in 1996, about 4,000 people died in
the same year while waiting for a transplant. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296, 16,296 (1998).
196. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 953; see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564-65
(1963) (affirming the Boulder Canyon Project Act as a comprehensive scheme for the apportionment of mainstream waters of the Colorado River among several states).
197. See supra note 86.
198. See supra Part I.D.
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spent the longest time on a waiting list be given first priority.199 How
does one reconcile these competing issues of fairness? Perhaps the
“fairest” option would be to hold a random selection lottery to determine who will receive an organ transplant.200
Still, many others argue that medical utility should be the primary factor in organ allocation.201 This principle seems to be the
guiding force behind the local-preference allocation policy followed
by UNOS. Fewer organs would be wasted if the organ spent as little
time as possible outside a human body and without a blood supply.202
But other valid allocation methods based on medical utility also exist.
Why not give the organ to the recipient with the best biological
match? Indeed, cadaveric kidneys are allocated this way. Alternatively, organs could go to the healthiest patients first, rather than to
the sickest, which could mean higher overall survival rates and less
need for retransplantation later. Lastly, it has been argued that the
recipient’s willingness to comply with a prescribed treatment regimen
after organ transplantation should also figure into the allocation decision.203
Even more controversial are the subjective factors that could be
used to select transplant recipients. Should the patient’s social worth
be considered in deciding whether to offer the organ transplant?204
Should we favor the thirty-eight-year-old patient with three young
children over the seventy-year-old patient with no dependents?
199. See Charles T. Carlstrom & Christy D. Rollow, The Rationing of Transplantable Organs: A Troubled Lineup, 17 CATO J. 163, 168 (1997).
200. See Robert F. Weir, The Issue of Fairness in the Allocation of Organs, 20 J. CORP. L.
91, 97 (1995).
201. Health care providers often place greater importance on medical utility than on fairness in discussing organ allocation. See id. at 102. Indeed, UNOS has stated that “[p]atient survival is the ultimate goal of organ allocation policy. In order to achieve the greatest net benefit
for the entire transplant population, the policy must be designed to attain the longest patient
survival time overall . . . .” UNOS Principles and Objectives of Equitable Organ Allocation, supra note 32.
202. See supra notes 56-57 and text accompanying notes.
203. See Ingrid Kinkopf-Zajac, Assessing Patient Compliance in the Selection of Organ
Transplant Recipients, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 503, 505 (1996). The patient’s compliance with the
prescribed treatment will obviously affect the success of the transplant. The patient must take
medications to prevent the body’s immune system from rejecting the organ. This drug therapy
must be taken for the duration of the patient’s life and often causes undesirable side effects
ranging from increased body hair to anemia, diabetes, and seizures. See id. at 506 & n.7.
204. See Nicholas Rescher, The Allocation of Exotic Medical Lifesaving Therapy, 79
ETHICS 173, 178-79 (1969) (arguing that society would be warranted in taking a patient’s family
role, as well as his potential future and his past service to society, into account when selecting
individuals for exotic medical treatment).
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Should we favor Mickey Mantle over the average Joe? Should a patient with a fifteen-year drinking problem be given a new liver? What
about using the patient’s ability to pay as a factor? Perhaps organs
should be allocated to the patients who can afford the considerable
costs of transplant surgery and drug medications. The plethora of potential factors in allocating organs ensures continued debate.
B.

Who Should Determine Organ Allocation Policy?

These considerations, however, prompt the more difficult
question—who should decide which of these factors are used to
formulate an acceptable organ allocation policy? Consider the
possible candidates:
1. Health Care Professionals. When Congress passed NOTA in
1984, it intended to leave organ transplant policy to the health care
providers.205 This determination accorded with the deeply rooted
belief that transplant professionals were the most knowledgeable and
therefore best suited to make these policy decisions. After the Final
Rule was issued, many people continued to argue that organ
allocation policy should be left to transplant professionals.206 In fact,
HHS included some language in the Final Rule that seemed to
reaffirm this belief:
The Department believes that the transplantation network must be
operated by professionals in the transplant community, and that
both allocation and other policies of the OPTN should be developed
by transplant professionals, in an open environment that includes
the public, particularly transplant patients and donor families. It is
not the desire or intention of the Department to interfere in the
207
practice of medicine.

Still, the notion that professionals should control the delivery of
health care has weakened in recent years. Many attribute the high
costs of health care to the fact that health care providers exercise
considerable discretion in deciding what services are purchased.208
205. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
206. See Hearing on the Final Rule, supra note 7, at 139 (statement of Lawrence G. Hunsicker, President, UNOS).
207. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. at 16,296, 16,300
(1998).
208. See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, Incentivizing Medical Practice: What (If Anything) Happens
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Rising concerns over costs have spurred market-oriented strategies in
financing and delivering health care, and these strategies have taken
away some of the control that providers enjoyed.209 Increased competition in health care places a greater emphasis on consumer and patient choice.210
HHS has also recognized that the old paradigm of professional
dominance is no longer wise. The recent clarification of the Final
Rule includes a provision limiting the influence of transplant physicians on the OPTN board of directors.211 The board must consist of
approximately fifty percent transplant physicians and at least twentyfive perfect transplant candidates, transplant recipients, and organ
donors.212 Additionally, the board must include representatives of
OPOs, transplant hospitals and coordinators, and the general public.213 These developments indicate that the paradigm of professional
dominance is waning.
2. Consumers. Following the increased emphasis on health care
consumerism, several scholars have argued for a market-based
approach to organ transplant policy. In general, these scholars have
focused greater attention on the use of financial incentives in
procuring organs than in allocating them.214 James Blumstein and
Henry Hansmann, however, have separately advocated that the
to Professionalism, 1 WID. L. SYMP. J. 1, 12-13 (1996) (discussing how physician control of
health care expenditures has resulted in health care cost inflation); Maxwell J. Mehlman, The
Patient-Physician Relationship in an Era of Scarce Resources: Is There a Duty to Treat?, 25
CONN. L. REV. 349, 350 (1993) (noting that physicians “play the dominant role in determining
the care that patients receive”).
209. See Mehlman, supra note 208, at 351; see also Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of
Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431,
441-44 (1988) (observing that many cost-control reforms seek to influence physician behavior).
210. See, e.g., Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets, and Democratic Values, 34 VAND.
L. REV. 1067, 1079-81 (1981) (discussing arguments for harnessing individual consumer choice
to curtail rising health care costs).
211. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 64 Fed. Reg. at 56,658 (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.3(a)).
212. See id.
213. See id. (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 121.3(a)(iii)).
214. See Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 32-43 (1989); Thomas G. Peters, Life or Death: The
Issue of Payment in Cadaveric Organ Donation, 265 JAMA 1302, 1304-05 (1991); Richard
Schwindt & Aidan R. Vining, Proposal for a Future Delivery Market for Transplant Organs, 11
J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 483, 489-97 (1986). Indeed, Pennsylvania recently announced a
controversial initiative to increase organ donations by providing a $300 stipend to help pay for
the funeral costs of organ donors. See Kathleen Kerr, Pa. May OK Pay for Organ Donations,
NEWSDAY, June 8, 1999, at A6.
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market should be used to distribute organs.215 Contrary to the
widespread belief that a market approach for allocation would favor
the rich, Hansmann has suggested that market-based allocation might
actually lead to a more egalitarian distribution compared to the
current system.216 Blumstein has argued that the use of financial
incentives would foster pluralism and diversity in medical care.217 This
Note does not attempt to explore the merits of these arguments. It is
sufficient to say at this juncture that most policymakers and
commentators remain reluctant to sanction the sale or purchase of
human body parts.218 As noted earlier, both federal and state laws
prohibit the sale or purchase of vascular organs.219
3. Federal Agencies. Arguably, federal agencies should
determine the factors used to formulate the policy on how organs are
distributed. Not surprisingly, this seems to be the position taken by
HHS. The Final Rule cites certain failures of the current providerdominated system as justification for federal intervention:
Another flaw in current OPTN policies pertains to disclosure of information. The statute requires the Secretary to provide information
to patients, their families, and physicians about transplantation. Current policies in this area do not give patients, their families, and physicians the timely information they need to help in selecting a trans220
plant hospital.

215. See generally James F. Blumstein, The Use of Financial Incentives in Medical Care: The
Case of Commerce in Transplantable Organs, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (1993) [hereinafter Blumstein, The Use of Financial Incentives in Medical Care]; Henry Hansmann, The Economics and
Ethics of Markets for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 57 (1989).
216. See Hansmann, supra note 215, at 80-81 (arguing that greater market influence in organ allocation decisions would supplant the “monolithic, national system of control that we currently have in [UNOS]”).
217. See Blumstein, The Use of Financial Incentives in Medical Care, supra note 215, at 13
(suggesting that allocating organs by price would curtail the current administrative allocation
bias favoring prosperous white males because insurance plans, which pay for most organ transplants, would bear the costs).
218. The World Health Organization holds that the sale of organs violates the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. See Rick Weiss, A LOOK AT . . . The Body Shop; At the Heart
of an Uneasy Commerce, WASH. POST, June 27, 1999, at B3. George Annas, a noted lawyer and
medical ethicist at Boston University, has stated that “commodifying organs through direct
purchase and sale is a bad idea.” Kerr, supra note 214, at A6. Dr. Francis Delmonico of Massachusetts General Hospital believes that “[s]ociety is not prepared to allow for your body to be
bought and sold.” Editorial, A Price Tag on Life, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 15, 1999, at A14.
219. See supra notes 28-29, 69 and accompanying text.
220. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, 63 Fed. Reg. 16,296, 16,298 (1998).
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The federal government can perhaps correct these deficiencies. The
Final Rule continues: “[T]he Department has an important and constructive role to play, particularly on behalf of patients. Human organs that are given to save lives are a public resource and a public
trust.”221 Therefore, the Secretary of HHS “may direct the OPTN to
adopt a policy, or may develop a policy that the OPTN must follow.”222 Perhaps some amount of government regulation is necessary
because the beneficiaries (transplant donors and recipients) are unable to protect their own interests.
Many are critical of federal regulation of organ transplantation.223 The public still considers government bureaucracy too inefficient and too slow to adapt to changing ideas. James Blumstein has
argued against a monolithic bureaucratic system because it runs
counter to the prevailing pluralism and diversity in health care policy
today.224 In doing so, Blumstein concedes that government regulation
might be justified if organ transplantation were viewed as somehow
“different” from the rest of health care.225 Believing transplantation
to be a part of ordinary medical care, Blumstein concludes that there
is no basis for special treatment of organ transplantation.226
Nonetheless, a good argument remains for treating organ transplantation differently than ordinary medical care. Under the Medicare and Medicaid programs, the federal government pays for more
than half of the transplant surgeries in the United States.227 The federal government pays for nearly all kidney transplant surgeries under

221. Id. at 16,300.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., Patient Access to Transplantation Coalition Statement, supra note 58 (“Do
federal policymakers really know better than transplant physicians and surgeons what is best
for their patients? We think not . . . .”); National Organ Transplant Policy Draws Fire in Louisiana; Doctors Fear State Will Come Up Short, BATON ROUGE SUNDAY ADVOC., Mar. 29,
1998, at 9B (“‘It seems to me the executive branch of government is trying to mandate health
care and trying to say that it knows more than the people who care about the patient.’”) (quoting Dr. Douglas P. Slakey).
224. See James F. Blumstein, Government’s Role in Organ Transplantation Policy, 14 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 5, 21 (1989) [hereinafter Blumstein, Government’s Role]; Blumstein,
The Use of Financial Incentives in Medical Care, supra note 215, at 11-13.
225. See Blumstein, Government’s Role, supra note 224, at 36.
226. See id.
227. See Organ Donations: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Departments of Labor,
Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 105th Cong. 10 (1998) (statement of Donna Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services) (visited Aug. 17, 1999) <http://www.hhs.gov/progorg/asl/testify/t980910a.txt> (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
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the End-Stage Renal Disease program.228 Perhaps organ transplantation is unique in medical care, since a standard unit—transplant organs—can be identified and measured.229 In no other area of medicine
can the allocation of a single resource determine the well-being of a
patient.
4. The States. The new state laws on organ allocation raise the
notion that state governments should determine how organs are
allocated. Allocation by the states, however, does not seem logical if
one believes that biological matching and broader equity should be
considerations in organ allocation. There has never been any
contention that the states would balance these factors with their
desire to keep organs procured within the state. Moreover, while the
states inherently possess the power to protect their citizens’ health
and welfare, it is doubtful that state officials generally have expertise
in the field of organ transplantation. Thus, the state laws that restrict
out-of-state organ transfers seem to be an inappropriate way for the
states to argue their case for the local preference in allocation. More
appropriate actions would be for state legislatures to pass resolutions
and submit them to Congress, for citizens to lobby their members of
Congress for action, or for the state Attorneys General to challenge
the Final Rule in courts.
5. The Courts. The enactment of state laws that restrict out-ofstate organ transfers may require the courts to enter the policy debate concerning organ allocation. Judges, who will inevitably face
policy questions in deciding these cases, should keep in mind the
broader policy implications of their decisions. For instance, courts
using the dormant Commerce Clause to strike down the state organ
allocation laws should consider the curious state of affairs that would
result if these laws were upheld. Absent court intervention, organ
allocation in the United States could devolve into a fragmented system, with some transplant centers following UNOS guidelines and
others following their states’ laws. This result would probably be un-

228. See Blumstein, Government’s Role, supra note 224, at 11; see also 42 U.S.C. § 426-1
(1994).
229. It has been argued that there must be pluralism and diversity in medical care because
it is impossible to identify standard “products” of medical care that can be precisely measured
in standard units. See ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION
TO THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE 1-9 (1980).
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satisfactory for most people, even those who advocate pluralism and
diversity in organ transplantation.
Though the courts should invalidate the state laws restricting
broader organ sharing, the courts are perhaps the poorest institutions
to make the broader organ allocation decisions that need to be made.
Federal judges possess neither expertise in organ transplant policy
nor an electoral mandate from voters. Thus, judges should limit their
judicial rulemaking to the specific legal conflicts presented to them.
CONCLUSION
In promulgating the Final Rule of April 2, 1998, HHS tried to
bring finality to the way in which organs are allocated in the United
States. Instead, the Final Rule has prompted more questions. As this
Note has shown, the attempts by some states to restrict out-of-state
organ transfers should fail because the dormant Commerce Clause
requires that the courts strike down these state laws. These attempts
ultimately raise broader organ allocation issues, the resolution of
which should be left to Congress. Only Congress can determine
whether HHS ultimately should control allocation policy, whether
the transplant community should be left to make these decisions, or
whether market forces should govern organ procurement and distribution. Though there is some indication that Congress will confront
these issues in the near future,230 it is likely that organ allocation will
remain a major point of contention for some time.

230. On October 13, 1999, the House Commerce Committee approved a bill that would
give UNOS the authority to make all substantive decisions regarding organ allocation and severely limit the federal government’s oversight of organ transplant policy. See H.R. 2418, 106th
Cong. § 3 (1999); Associated Press, Bill Strips Feds of Authority Over Transplants, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Oct. 14, 1999, at A10. Additionally, the bill would allow the states to pass laws keeping
organs within the states. See Associated Press, supra. The Senate is considering similar legislation. See Stolberg, supra note 11, at A1. However, President Clinton would probably veto such
a bill if it passed Congress. See Associated Press, supra.

